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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ST ATE OF UT AH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I 
vs. 
IVOR D. JONES and RUA C. JONES, CASE No. 11801 
his wife, and STATE BANK OF ( 
SOUTHERN UTAH, ' 
Defendants and Respondents.' 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The nature of this case is a review of a jury trial 
in the District Court of Iron County, Utah, pertaining to 
a condemnation of several small pieces of land in Iron 
County, State of Utah, for purposes of Interstate High-
way 15. This particular land is located approximately 
five miles North and slightly East of Cedar City in Iron 
County, State of Utah, and is on a large gentle curve 
where the road turns from Northeast of North to North-
east toward Summit, Utah, as one proceeds northerly on 
said Interstate 15. Condemnation was allowed by the 
District Court of Iron County, Utah, and the matter was 
tried before an Iron County jury commencing 25 June, 
1969, and terminating on 26 June, 1969. This particular 
case was unique from one standpoint: The jury consist-
ed of eight women. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
As stated above, this was a jury trial by eight wo-
men, commencing 25 .June, 1969, and terminating 26 
June, 1969: The matter was finally submitted to the jury, 
and they were sent out of the courtroom at 4:24 p. m. on 
26 June, 1969, and came in with a verdict at 6:42 the 
same evening. The verdict was as follows' 
1 
Market value of the property taken by the 
State (includes property taken in fee as 
well as for easements) _______________________________ _ 





Thereafter, the Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment 
n.o.v. by and for the reason that it was quite apparent 
the damages awarded by the jury were the result or 
misunderstanding of the Court's instructions, and by 
and for the further reason that all evidence offered bv 
the defendants was based upon a sale of lots out of 
subdivision and the entire case of the defendants was 
improper; that for this reason the judgment should be 
reduced to the sum of $2400.00 which was the only quaJ. 
ified testimony given pertaining to damages. 
Plaintiff also filed an alternate motion for remit-
titure asking for the remitting of all severance damages 
awarded by the jury in the above entitled matter, by 
and for the reason that it was most apparent that the 
jury did not understand the court's instructions and 
misapplied same, and that the severance damages as 
awarded by the jury were excessive, and that there was 
no acceptable evidence offered by the defendants for 
severance damages. 
Plaintiff also made an alternate motion for a new 
trial for the same reasons. 
These motions were argued to the Court by respec-
tive counsel for the parties in a law and motion day on 
10 July 1969, same having been reset by court order 
from a later law and motion day originally scheduled 
for 17 July 1969. 
The Honorable C. Nelson Day issued a Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Motion for Judgment N.0.V. or 
for New Trial after having taken the matter under ad-
visement on the 24th day of July, 1969, which was duly 
filed thereafter by the Clerk of the District Court of Iron 
County, Utah. There are some very interesting findings 
in this memorandum decision which has been included 
in Designation of Record on Appeal of the Appellant as 
Item 16. These findings that are of special interest are 
as follows: 
2 
"4. The landowner, Ivor D. Jones, testified he valued 
all of his land on the southeast side of U. s. 91 at 
$1,500.00 per acre, including the 35.95 acres taken and 
' the severance to the 37.45 acres remaining at 
an average of $1.115.70 per acre or just over 74 per cent 
of his $1,500 00 per acre valuation. 
"5. The defendants' expert witness, Mr. Marcellus Pal-
mer valued all of defendants' land on the southeast 
side of U. S. 91 at $1,490.00 per acre, including that 
taken by the State, and the severance damages to the 
acres remaining at an average of $1,104.58 per 
acre, also just over 74 per cent of his $1,490.00 per 
acre valuation. 
"6. The only other witness as to valuation was the 
State's expert, Mr. Ken Esplin, who valued the de-
fendants' land southeast of U. S. 91 at $55.00 per acre 
for that portion broken up and $28.00 per acre for 
the native brush land. He placed his severance dam-
ages at $27.50 and $14.00 per acre respectively or ex-
actly 50 per cent on the remainder land. 
"7. The jury, which consisted of eight women, return-
ed a verdict of $3,121.30 for the property taken and 
$10,800 for severance damages. This was computed at 
$86.80 per acre for the 35.96 acres of property taken 
and $288.38 per acre as severance damages to the 37.45 
acres of property remaining. The $288.38 per acre sev-
erance damages to the property is 332 plus per cent of 
the $86.80 per acre valuation of the property actually 
taken. 
"11. The Court is of the opinion that the jury verdict 
\Vas not based properly on the evidence of the case, 
and that the jury's award of severance damages in the 
amount they did, was grossly excessive. 
''12. The plaintiff State of Utah is entitled (1) To an 
order of this Court reducing the total judgment herein 
to the sum of $8,000.00, or (2) in the event the defend-
ants filP objections thereto within 15 days of the date 
hereof a nev.: trial. If no objections by defendants. are 
filed 15 days from date hereof, the clerk· is 
directed to enter the judgment for defendants on such 
3 
reduced. amount .. If are filed within such 15-
day per10d, the Jury verdict 1s to be set aside and thr 
case set for retrial." 
The defendants failed to file any objections unde 
the situations set fourth, in Paragraph 12 of said 
orandum decision, and plaintiff elected to appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court 
find that the defendants offered no acceptable evidence 
of value, and to render a judgment against the plaintiff 
pursuant to the testimony of Mr. Esplin the amount of 
$2400. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Appellant's Exhibit 1 which was not includ. 
ed in the designation of record on appear, due to size and 
inconvenience of transportation, was a large photogra-
phic map which included the entire project of the State 
Road Commission from North Cedar City to Summit in 
Iron County, Utah. Counsel now attempts to replace the 
photo map by a word picture. The defendant, Mr. Jones, 
had acquired approximately 1,000 acres of land, more or 
less, approximately six miles North Northeast of Cedar 
City, Utah, in Iron County, somewhat to the East of what 
is locally known as Webster's Hill where U. S. 91 turns 
and runs generalJy northeasterly toward Summit, Utah 
This property had been acquired approximately fifteen 
or twenty years, or more, before condemnation, and the 
property was already bisected by U. S. Highway 91 on 
the southern extremity thereof, and by a dirt road which 
left U. S. 91 at approximately the middle of the area 
where the Jones property went across 91; then due West 
through the Jones property to Enoch, Utah. Of the Jones 
land, 160 acres was South of this road and the remainder 
was North of this road. The property that is spoken of 
and described in the exhibits as being subdivided, is the 
area between the Enoch road and Highway 91. The large 
portion of the property is on the North of the Enoch 
road. In Mr. Jones' property acquirements in this particu-
lar area, corners of three pieces extended Southeast of 
91. There was approximately one-fourth mile between 
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these pieces. The corn;tl"uclion of Interstate 15 was on the 
Southeast of 91, with '.H being used for a frontage road 
on the nort!Hvest side. Interstate 15 also coming North 
from Cedar City made the curve to the right and headed 
for Summit in more or less a northeasterly direction, 
and took a portion of each of the three parcels that were 
on the southeast side of 91 before the Interstate was 
planned. The property was ci.11 zoned A-1, or Agricultural, 
under the County zoning area. The taking in the three 
parcels consisted of 34.35 acres actually taken, and ease-
ments of 1.61 acres. The date of taking was 18 October, 
1%7. On Parcel 9, the taking was 2.01 acres. However, 
approximately 8 acres were left between Interstate 15 
and Highway 91 on the north side of Interstate 15, On 
Parcel 10, the taking, including the easements, was al-
most 1J acres, with a small parcel left South of Inter-
state 15 and another parcel left North of Interstate 15, 
and between it and Highway 91. The parcel between In-
terstate 15 and Highway 91 was narrower than on Par-
cel 9. Again, on Parcel 11, the actual taking was some-
thing over 20 acres, with in excess of 28 acres left South 
of Interstate 15, and nine and a fraction left between In-
terstate 15 and High\\ ay 91 on the North of Interstate 15, 
again longer and narrower than the previous parcels. All 
parties testified that the land of Mr. Jones Northwest of 
Highway 91 was not affected by the construction of the 
Interstate. All lands South of Highway 91 and affected 
by the Interstate were zoned A-1, or Agricultural. A 
portion of the land North of Highway 91 and South of 
the Enoch road, consisting of approximately 100 acres 
being severed from the rest of the Jones land on the 
:\orth by the Enoch rnad, had been subdivided and sales 
\'.ere taking place in that area. The area South of High-
way 91, which included Parcel 11, had been planted in-
to wheatgrass pactures. Those areas South of the High-
way 91 \Vhich included Parcels 9 and 10, were in native 
brush, rocks and trees. Parcels 10 and 11 had been fenc-
ed. Parcel 9 had not been fenced. On the South of tnese 
parcels was public domain. An earthen tank had been 
made on the area including Parcel 11 to hold rain wa'ter 
for stockwatering which was generally not available 
otherwise unless stockwatering was accomplished by 
hauling \Yater whi::n these areas were pastured. The areas 
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from which Parcels 9, 10 and 11 were taken did not touch 
each other, and were severed from other property of the 
defendants by Highway 91. Prior to the construction, the 
defendants owned three distinct parcels of land South 
of Highway 91, each of which was affected by the con-
struction of Interstate 15. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY 
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE OF VALUE ON THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
The trial court erred in allowing the defendants' tes-
timony to be presented on a subdivision basis. The tes-
timony of all defendants was quite clear that the proper-
ty South of Highway 91 had not been subdivided at the 
time of the taking, and had been left out intentionally 
of any plans of subdivision that the defendants had ini-
tiated, and was left out at the election of the defendants. 1 
This may be found in the testimony of Ivor D. Jones, 
property owner, commencing in the transcript on Page 
21, line 25, through Page 22, line 8. Plaintiff's objections 
to going forward on this basis were overruled, which may 
be found on Page 22, line 17, to Page 23, line 5, and again 
on Page 24, line 4, through page 27, line J 9. All this was 
testified to by the property owner on Page 24 in the tran-
script from line 1 through line 12, and these were iden-
tical figures with those later used by Mr. Palmer and 
tied to the Village Green subdivision. 
It became quite clear that the defendants were re-
lying entirely on sales of lots out of subdivisions in a 
Voir Dire Examination commencing on Page 53, brought 
on by questions asked on Page 53, line 1, said item run-
ning to Page 63, line 14. On Page 61, at line 17, of the 
transcript, a motion for mistrial was made by counsel 
for plaintiff, which was overruled. On Page 62 at line 20, 
motion to strike all testimony relating to subdivision 
purchases was made, and along with overruling this mo-
tion, on Page 62, line 26, the Court acknowledged that 
the objections went to Mr. Palmer's entire line of testi· 
mony, and both the objections, the motion to strike and 
the mis-trial were overruled and denied, ending on Page 
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63 at line 6. Again on Page 63 at line 9, as a matter of 
record, a continuing objection to any testimony cone:ern-
ing these subdivisions was allowed so that it was not ne-
cessary to make an objection to each question. On line 
13, the Court allowecl the objection to become a matter 
of record. The acknowledgment of the Court and the un-
derstanding that the objecfrms were to run to the en-
tire line of testimony were reiterated, on Page 71, line 
24, to Page 71, line 26 of the transcript. 
A complete examination of the transcript of the 
defendants' entire testimony fails to reveal any other in-
formation upon which to base an opinion of the value of 
the property, than the sales out of the subdivision acros 
Highway 91 to the North. Under these conditions, Mr. 
Palmrr came up with an opinion of value of $1,500.00 per 
acre which was identical with the opinion of value of 
Mr. Ivor D. Jones, and both admitted that this was $25.00 
and $50.00 land for grazing land, and that there had been 
no attempt to put a subdivision on the South side of 91. 
There is a whole line of cases that hold that even 
in city areas with subdivisions going up all around, un-
less the property has actually been subdividied, the mea-
sure of damages is to be based upon what the evidence 
shows was the value at the date of service of summons, 
and that a situation where value is placed on small par-
cels, not in the size of the actual parcel, is improper. In 
Redwood City Elemenatry School District vs McGregor, 
276 P2d 78. a California case decided in 1954, it was held 
that a J acre parcel of improved land used for com-
mercial production of flowers and various item in con-
nection therewith, the jury was required to determine 
the value ot the parcel not as if it had been divided into 
small parcels, but as it was used as a whole on the date 
of the taking, and any evidence as to what the owner 
might plan to do with the land could not be considered 
as enhancing its market value. This has been endorsed 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State of Utah 
vs Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 291 P2d 1028. In this case, d,e-
fendants testified as to value based upon the price. at 
which it could be sold in small pieces if buyers -could be 
found. and failure to grant plaintiff's motion to strjke 
'' 
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defendants' expert testimony as to values was under th 
cirsumstance prejudicial, which prejudice was not overe 
come by the instructions given. This case holds that 
condemnee is not entitled to realize a profit on his 
perty and that it must go to the condemnor for its faii 
market value, as is, irrespective of any claimed value. 
based on an aggregate of values of individual lots in a 
subdivision which one hopes to sell at a future time to 
individuals rather than to an individual. This rule ap. 
plies, whether the property is platted or not. The sale 
should be the sale as a single unit, regardless of whatever 
the state of completion of the subdivision may be, and a 
fair market value is the price that same will bring from 
a willing buyer buying the whole tract. The Utah State 
Supreme Court has long held that any anticipated pro-
fits which were contractial are therefore not recoverable 
and should not be allowed. In addition to the Tedesco 
case, this was held in State Road Commission vs Noble. 
6 Utah 2d, 42, 305 P2d 495; Weber Basin vs Braeg· 
ger, 8 Utah 2d 346, 334, P2d 758, and many others. Yet, 
although cases are legion that hold that the condemnee 
is not entitled to a profit and irrspective of any claimed 
value based on an aggregate of values of individual lots 
in a subdivision which one hopes to sell at a future time 
to many individuals rather than to one individual, at the 
same time over continuing objection, and motion for 
mis-trial, this was allowed in the case now being ap-
pealed, and no other evidence was offered whatsoever. 
Under these conditions, there is only one acceptable 
bit of evidence as to the value in the entire case, and 
that is the testimony of Mr. Esplin, commencing at Page 
144, line 12, to Page 147. line 29, where he gave his valua-
tions, where he got them, and came up with an opinion 
as to the fair market value of the damage done to the 
landowner of $2400. Under these conditions, there can 
be no question but that the trial court again erred on 
its failure to grant the motion of the plaintiff for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict of $2400. 
Pont II 
THE JURY WAS ENTIRELY CONFUSED. 
There is no question that the ladies of the jury were 
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te confused. In all probability the undersigned was a party 
to the confusion. In Judge Day's Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Motion for Juctgment N.O.V. or For New 
Trial, he makes a finding to this effect. This is finding 
7. Regardless of how one approaches this problem, 
either from the standpoint of subdivision lots, grazing 
ground, or any other way to approach values on these 
properties, certainly on that portion of the land that was 
.Southeast of Highway 91, through which the freeway 
\,·cnt. regardless of \vhat value we put on it, the man is 
llarmed a greater amount per acre by entirely depriving 
him of his land than he is by leaving it in odd shapes 
and limiting the use. Yet, in Finding No. 7 of the trial 
Judge, on the motion for judgment n.o.v. there is a 
tl'l€ motion fop judgment n.o.v-. 
find/«-}n which these items have been figured out. 
Three Thousand One Hundred and Twenty-one Dol-
lars and Thirty Cents was the finding for the property 
taken. Ten Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars was the find-
ing for damages. Yet, the odd thing is that the 
two acreages were almost irl.entical in the totals. The 
35.96 acres of propetry taken, including the easements, 
divided into $3,121.30 is $86.90 per acre. Yet, for approx-
i:nately an acre and a half more land, of which the de-
fendant still has lhe use, he was given damages of $10,-
800.00 which computes out to $288.39 per acre. Regard-
less of how we aµproach this problem, severance should 
not be a greater amount per acre than the land actually 
taken. The action of the trial judge in reducing the judg-
ment to S8,000.00 is based entirely upon a finding of con-
fusion. The failure of the defendant to file an objection, 
as set forth in Finding No. 12, is an admission of the con-
fusion. Certainly, if the defendants had been of the opin-
ion that this testimony was correct and the jury was not 
confused, they would not consent to an almost $6,000.00 
reduction in a jury verdict under these circumstances. 
The action of the trial court reduced the verdict from 
$13,921.30 to $8,000. Why should the defendants acquiese? 
This acquiescPnce alone is <m acknowledgment of the 
confusion of the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the circumstances of this matter, we can only 
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conclude that confusion prevailed; The jury speculate( 
and came up with an unreasonable and wholly improper 
verdict, and that inasmuch as the only proper opinion 
of value was that of Mr. Esplin in the sum of $2400.00, 
the entire matter should be remanded to the trial court 
with orders to enter a judgment in favor of the defend. 
ants for $2400.00 and interest on the portions not paid 
at the time of obtaining the order of occupation in ac-
cordance with the statutory provisions applicable there. 
to. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General of Utah 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
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